Coordination in Oligopoly

Johan Stennek (johan.stennek@economics.gu.se)

Working Papers from Stockholm - International Economic Studies

Abstract: The private and social efficiency of two "behavioral" coordination mechanisms is examined in this paper. In Cournot oligopoly, firms prefer immediate coordination on the Nash equilibrium (interpreted as a preplay communication) over the best-reply dynamics (and fictitious play) which converge to the equilibrium, but with delay (interpreted as a decentralized learning process). In Bertrand oligopoly, firms prefer the learning process.

Keywords: OLIGOPOLIES; NASH EQUILIBRIUM (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13 pages
Date: 1997
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:stocin:634

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