Information Accumulation in Development

Daron Acemoglu and Fabrizio Zilibotti

Working Papers from Stockholm - International Economic Studies

Abstract: We propose a model in which economic relations and institutions in advanced and less developed countries differ as these societies have access to different amounts of information. The lack of information in less developed economies makes it hard to evaluate the performance of managers, and leads to high "agency costs". As well as factors related to the informational infrastructure, we emphasize that societies accumulate information by repeating certain tasks. Poor societies may therefore have less information partly because the scarcity of capital restricts the repetition of various activities.

Keywords: INFORMATION; DEVELOPMENT POLICY; INCENTIVES; RISK; EVALUATION STOCKHOLM SWEDEN. 43p. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 M13 O13 O14 O40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Information Accumulation in Development (1999)
Working Paper: Information Accumulation in Development (1998)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:stocin:652

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Stockholm - International Economic Studies UNIVERSITY OF STOCKHOLM, INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC STUDIES, S- 106 91 STOCKHOLM SWEDEN.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Krichel ().