Why Central Banks Announce their Objectives: Monetary Policy with Discretionary Signalling

S. Palmqvist

Working Papers from Stockholm - International Economic Studies

Abstract: This paper analyzes the use of announcements of objectives or intentions, announcements which are common in implementation of monetary policy. This paper assumes that a central bank can signal at its own discretion and shows that while central banks with high inflation targets never use announcements, central banks with low inflation targets occasionally, but not always, will choose to reveal their private information through an announcement.

Keywords: MONETARY POLICY; CENTRAL BANKS; ECONOMIC POLICY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E52 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:stocin:663

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