The Equilibrium Degree of Transparency and Control in Monetary Policy

Jon Faust () and Lars Svensson

Working Papers from Stockholm - International Economic Studies

Abstract: We examine a central bank's endogenous choice of degree of control and degree of transparency, under both commitment and discretion. We argue that discretion is the more realistic assumption for the choice of control and that commitment is more realistic for the choice of transparency.

Keywords: MONETARY POLICY; CENTRAL BANKS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E52 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Equilibrium Degree of Transparency and Control in Monetary Policy (2002)
Working Paper: The Equilibrium Degree of Transparency and Control in Monetary Policy (1999)
Working Paper: The equilibrium degree of transparency and control in monetary policy (1999)
Working Paper: The Equilibrium Degree of Transparency and Control in Monetary Policy (1999)
Working Paper: The Equilibrium Degree of Transparency and Control in Monetary Policy (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:stocin:669

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