Crime Rates and Expected Sanctions: The Economics of Deterrence Revisited

O. Bar-Gill and Alon Harel ()

Working Papers from Tel Aviv

Abstract: the effects of the crime rate on the expected sanction. It turns out that these effects are versatile and rich, both in the direction and the magnitude of their influence on the expected sanction. After analyzing these counter effects of the crime rate on the expected sanction, we present a new model of deterrence, which explicitly incorporates the crime rate as one of the determinants of the expected sanction. The adjusted model is then used to study the effects of the crime rate on deterrence and on optimal law enforcement policy.

Keywords: RESEARCH; CRIMES; POLITICS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2000
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Journal Article: Crime Rates and Expected Sanctions: The Economics of Deterrence Revisited (2001)
Working Paper: Crime Rates and Expected Sanctions: The Economics of Deterrence Revisited (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:teavfo:00-14

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