A Note on Multi-Issue Two-Sided Bargaining: Bilateral Procedures

Chaim Fershtman ()

Working Papers from Tel Aviv

Abstract: This note considers a two-sided multi-issue bargaining problem in which players that belong to the same "side" may have conflicting priorities regarding the different negotiated issues. The note examines different bilateral bargaining procedures and shows the different equilibrium settlement that they yield. In particular the note examines the posiibility that group heterogeneity (conflicting priorities) may be exploited in order to gain a better settlement.

Keywords: BARGAINING (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 1998
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: A Note on Multi-Issue Two-Sided Bargaining: Bilateral Procedures (2000)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:teavfo:06-98

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Tel Aviv Israel TEL-AVIV UNIVERSITY, THE FOERDER INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH, RAMAT AVIV 69 978 TEL AVIV ISRAEL.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Krichel ().