Informational Smallness in Rational Expectations Equilibria
A Heifetz and
Enrico Minelli
Working Papers from Tel Aviv
Abstract:
In an economy with asymmetric information, Rational Expectations Equilibria (REE) need not become asymptotically incentive compatible, even if many independent replicas of the economy are merged together. We identify a sub-class of REE for which this is nevertheless the case.
Keywords: INFORMATION; ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 1997
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Journal Article: Informational smallness in rational expectations equilibria (2002)
Working Paper: Informational Smallness in Rational Expectations Equilibria (1996)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:teavfo:10-97
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