Debates and Decisions: On a Rationale of Argumentation Rules

Jacob Glazer (glazer@post.tau.ac.il) and Ariel Rubinstein (rariel@tauex.tau.ac.il)

Working Papers from Tel Aviv

Abstract: Debates often serve as intitutions of mechanisms for resolving conflicts and making decisions. In this paper , we present a simple model in order to explain two phenomena concerning debate rules.

Keywords: DECISION; MAKING (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D80 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 1997
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Journal Article: Debates and Decisions: On a Rationale of Argumentation Rules (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:teavfo:17-97

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