On Knots and Dynamics in Games

S. DeMichelis and Fabrizio Germano

Working Papers from Tel Aviv

Abstract: We extend Kohlberg and Mertens' (1986) structure theorem concerning the Nash equilibrium correspondence to show that its graph is not only homomorphic to the underlying space of games but that it is also unknotted. This is then shown to have some basic consequences for dynamics whose rest points are Nash equilibria.

Keywords: GAME THEORY; ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13 pages
Date: 2000
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Related works:
Journal Article: On (un)knots and dynamics in games (2002)
Working Paper: On knots and dynamics in games (2000)
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