Intergenerational Redistribution with Short-Lived Governements

Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman

Working Papers from Tel Aviv

Abstract: We study the politics of intergenerational redistribution in an overlapping-generations model with short-lived governements. The successive governements -who care about the welfare of the currently living generations and possibly about campaign contributions- are unable to pre-commit the future course of redistributive taxation. In a stationary politico-economic equilibrium, the tax rate in each period depends on the current state of the economy and all expectations about future political outcomes are fulfilled. We find that there exists multiple stationary equilibria in many political settings. Steady-state welfare is often lower than it would be in the absence of redistributive politics.

Keywords: GOVERNMENT; INCOME REDISTRIBUTION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D30 H23 H80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41 pages
Date: 1996
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Related works:
Journal Article: Intergenerational Redistribution with Short-Lived Governments (1998)
Working Paper: Intergenerational Redistribution with Short-lived Governments (1996)
Working Paper: Intergenerational Redistribution with Short-Lived Governments (1996)
Working Paper: Intergenerational Redistribution with Short-Lived Governments (1996)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:teavfo:2-96

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