Arrow`s Theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem as Special Cases of a Single Theorem

Kfir Eliaz

Working Papers from Tel Aviv

Abstract: This paper shows that both Arrow`s Theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem follow from a single impossibility theorem. This theorem states that two properties - Pareto efficiency and a condition called Preference Reversal - lead to the dictatorship result.

Keywords: EFFICIENCY; SOCIAL ASPECTS; PREFERENCES (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 10 pages
Date: 2001
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:teavfo:2001-11

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