A Derivation of Expected Utility Maximization in the Context of a Game

Itzhak Gilboa and David Schmeidler

Working Papers from Tel Aviv

Abstract: A decision maker faces a decision problem, or a game against nature. For each probability distribution over the state of the world (nature`s strategies), she has a weak order over her acts (pure strategies). We formulate conditions on these weak orders guaranteeing that they can be jointly represented by expected utility maximization with respect to an almost-unique state-dependent utility, that is, a matrix assigning real numbers to act-state pairs.

Keywords: GAMES; DISTRIBUTION; DECISION MAKING (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2001
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Journal Article: A derivation of expected utility maximization in the context of a game (2003)
Working Paper: A Derivation of Expected Utility Maximization in the Context of a Game (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:teavfo:2001-18

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