Status Concerns and the Organization of Work

Chaim Fershtman (), Yoram Weiss and Hans Hvide

Working Papers from Tel Aviv

Abstract: We study the effects of local status, where workers compare their wage to the wage of other workers within the same firm. We assume a competitive labor market with unobservable effort, where firms condition wages on output as incentive for effort. If workers who care about status are also more productive, such status concerns generate an equilibrium with heterogenous firms where workers who care and workers who do not care about status work together.

Keywords: WAGES; WORKERS; DISCRIMINATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D4 I2 J3 Z1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 44 pages
Date: 2001
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:teavfo:2001-2

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