A Dynamic Oligopoly with Collusion and Price Wars

Chaim Fershtman () and Ariel Pakes

Working Papers from Tel Aviv

Abstract: In this paper we extend the collusion framework to allow for heterogeneity among firms, investment, entry and exit. The focus is on a model with symmetric information in which it is hard to sustain collusion when either; one of the firms does not keep up with the advances of its competitors (both inside and outside the industry), or a "low quality" entrant enters.

Keywords: OLIGOPOLIES; MARKET STRUCTURE (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38 pages
Date: 1998
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Related works:
Journal Article: A Dynamic Oligopoly with Collusion and Price Wars (2000)
Working Paper: A Dynamic Oligopoly with Collusion and Price Wars (1999)
Working Paper: A Dynamic Oligopoly with Collusion and Price Wars (1999)
Working Paper: A Dynamic Oligopoly with Collusion and Price Wars (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:teavfo:26-98

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