Public Disclosure of Patent Applications, R&D, and Welfare

Reiko Aoki and Y. Spiegel

Working Papers from Tel Aviv

Abstract: In Europe and in Japan, patent applications are publicly disclosed after 18 months from the filing date regardless of whether a patent has been or will be registered. In the U.S. in contrast, patent applications are publicly disclosed only when a patent is granted. In this paper we examine the consequences of this difference for (i) firm's R&D and patenting behavior, (ii) consumers' surplus and social welfare, and (iii) the incentives of firms to innovate in a setting where patent protection is imperfect in the sense that patent applications may be rejected and patents are not always upheld in court. The main conclusions are that public disclosure leads to fewer patent applications and fewer innovations, but for a given number of innovations, it raises the probability that new technologies will reach the product market and thereby enhances consumers' surplus and possibly total welfare as well.

Keywords: RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT; PATENTS; CONSUMPTION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O31 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 1998
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Working Paper: Public Disclosure of Patent Applications, R & D, and Welfare (2000)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:teavfo:30-98

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Tel Aviv Israel TEL-AVIV UNIVERSITY, THE FOERDER INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH, RAMAT AVIV 69 978 TEL AVIV ISRAEL.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Krichel ().