Pre-Contractual Reliance
Lucian Bebchuk (bebchuk@law.harvard.edu) and
O. Ben-Shahar
Working Papers from Tel Aviv
Abstract:
During contarctual negotiations, but before entering a contarct, parties might make reliance expenditures. Such expenditures would increase the surplus should a contarct be made, but would wasted if not. This paper analyses parties' decisions to invest in pre-contractual reliance under alternative legal regime.
Keywords: CONTRACTS; DECISION MAKING (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D80 D81 K12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 42 pages
Date: 1996
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Journal Article: Precontractual Reliance (2001)
Working Paper: Pre-Contractual Reliance (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:teavfo:31-96
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