On the Evolution of Attitudes Towards Risk in Winner-Take-All Games

Eddie Dekel and Suzanne Scotchmer

Working Papers from Tel Aviv

Abstract: A long-standing conjecture is that winner-take-all games such as patent races lead to the survival of risk-takers and the extinction of risk-averters. In many species a winner-take-all game determines the males' right to reproduce, and the same argument suggests that males will evolve to be risk-takers. Psychological and sociological evidence buttresses the argument that males are more risk-taking than females. Using an evolutionary model of preference-formation, we investigate to what extent evolution leads to risk-taking in winner-take-all environments.

Keywords: GAME THEORY; BEHAVIOUR; RISK (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (66)

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Journal Article: On the Evolution of Attitudes towards Risk in Winner-Take-All Games (1999)
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