A Posnerian Model of Entry into Regulated Markets

B Chakravorti and Y Spiegel

Working Papers from Tel Aviv - the Sackler Institute of Economic Studies

Abstract: In this paper we investigate why regulators may wish to open regulated markets to entry by unregulated firms. We adopt Posner's view of regulation as a taxation scheme, whereby regulators set high rates in some markets in order to subsidize other markets.

Keywords: REGULATION; BUSINESS ORGANIZATION; MONOPOLIES (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L11 L43 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41 pages
Date: 1996
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:teavsa:45-96

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