Systems Competition, Vertical Merger and Foreclosure

Jeffrey Church and Neil Gandal

Working Papers from Tel Aviv - the Sackler Institute of Economic Studies

Abstract: In this paper we address the possibility of foreclosure in markets where the final good consists of a system composed of a hardware good and compelementary software and the value of the system depends on the availability of software.

Keywords: MERGERS; PRODUCTS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L12 L22 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 40 pages
Date: 1996
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Journal Article: Systems Competition, Vertical Merger, and Foreclosure (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:teavsa:6-96

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