Simplicity of Solution Concepts: Subgame Perfect Equilibrium in Extensive Games v.s. Iteratively undominated Strategies in Normal games

Jacob Glazer () and Ariel Rubinstein ()

Working Papers from Tel Aviv - the Sackler Institute of Economic Studies

Keywords: game; theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16 pages
Date: 1993
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:teavsa:9-93

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