Core and Bargaining Set of Shortest Path Games

S. Grahn

Working Papers from Uppsala - Working Paper Series

Abstract: In this paper it is shown that the core and the bargaining sets of Davis-Maschler and Zhou coincide in a class of shortest path games.

Keywords: GAME THEORY; ECONOMIC MODELS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:uppaal:2001:03

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