Deposit Insurance and Moral Hazard: Does the Counterfactual Matter?

Reint Gropp and J. Vesala

Working Papers from Quebec a Montreal - Recherche en gestion

Abstract: The paper analyses the relationship between deposit insurance, debt-holder monitoring, bank charter, and risk taking for European Banks.

Keywords: INSURANCE; RISK; BANKS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G20 G24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
Date: 2001
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (45)

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Working Paper: Deposit insurance and moral hazard: does the counterfactual matter? (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:uqamge:47

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