Pivotal Buyers and Bargaining Power

A. Raskovich

Working Papers from U.S. Department of Justice - Antitrust Division

Abstract: Securing sales to a large bayer can be pivotal to a supplier' s decision to produce. Conventional wisdom holds that being pivotal improves a bayer's bargaining position. This paper finds otherwise. In a model in which a supplier bargains bilaterally with multiple buyers, becoming pivotal through merger always tends to worsen the merging buyers' bargaining position vis-a-vis the supplier.

Keywords: BARGAINING; DECISION MAKING; PRODUCTION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 L10 L23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2000
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:usjuat:00-9

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