Moral Hazard and the Market for Used Automobiles

E.R. Dunham

Working Papers from U.S. Department of Justice - Antitrust Division

Abstract: This paper examines a moral hazard problem faced by the owners of fleet automobiles. because fleet vehicules are generally not driven by their owners, the drivers of these vehicules do not bear all of the costs of either neglecting or abusing the vehicule.

Keywords: RISK; AUTOMOBILES; COSTS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D12 D18 L62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 1996
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:usjuat:96-04

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