The Entry Including Effects of Horizontal Mergers

Gregory Werden and Luke Froeb

Working Papers from U.S. Department of Justice - Antitrust Division

Abstract: An anticompetitive horizontal merger creats an opportunity for entry, which might deter or counteract the competitive effects of concern. This paper analyzes mergers in randomly generated Cournot and Bertrand Industries to ascertain the incremental effect of the mergers on the profitability of entry, and determine the net effects on prices welfare of the mergers followd by entry.

Keywords: MERGERS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G30 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 1996
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:usjuat:96-08

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