Lowering Price by Buying Competitors in Order to Shut Them Down

S. Kimmel

Working Papers from U.S. Department of Justice - Antitrust Division

Abstract: This paper considers a potential entrant that cannot enter without paying an avoidable cost and cannot commit toi that until after incumbent firms have committed to their output.

Keywords: COMPETITION; PRICING (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D40 D43 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 10 pages
Date: 1996
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:usjuat:96-10

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