A Robust test for Consumer Welfare Enhancing Mergers Among Sellers of a Homogeneous Product

Luke Froeb and Gregory Werden

Working Papers from U.S. Department of Justice - Antitrust Division

Abstract: Antiturst enforcement agencies and courts use net effect on price as a touchstone for the legality of mergers. This paper derives a simple, and completely general, condition for implementing that standard when industry equilibrium is static Nash in qualities (Cournot).

Keywords: MERGERS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K20 K21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 3 pages
Date: 1997
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: A robust test for consumer welfare enhancing mergers among sellers of a homogeneous product (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:usjuat:97-1

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