Analysing Welfare in Related Markets: Durable Goods and Aftermarkets

M.J. McCabe

Working Papers from U.S. Department of Justice - Antitrust Division

Abstract: The "aftermarkets" literature focuses on two important questions: (1) Do durable goods manufacturers that control their aftermarkets have an incentive to charge afetrmarket prices that exceed costs? (2) How significant (in a welfare sense) is the resulting distortion? Unlike previous work, this paper addresses that latter question by explicitly modeling firmm behavior under various market structure conditions.

Keywords: PRICING; PRODUCTION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L10 L11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 10 pages
Date: 1997
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:usjuat:97-4

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