Endogenous Formation of Competitive Research Sharing Joint Ventures

P. Greenlee

Working Papers from U.S. Department of Justice - Antitrust Division

Abstract: Research joint ventures may coordinate research investments or improve research sharing. When research joint venture partners only share R&D results, large consortia are more profitable than small ones, and joint ventures prefer their rivals dispersed. According to a coalition formation game, an oligopoly partitions itself asymmetrically into two or three coalitions for a wide range of parameter values.

Keywords: RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT; JOINT VENTURES; COMPETITION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L40 O33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 43 pages
Date: 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:usjuat:99-2

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