The Organization of Financial Exchange Markets: Theory and Evidence

S.C. Pirrong

Washington University from Business, Law and Economics Center, John M. Olin School of Business, Washington University

Abstract: This article presents theory and evidence regarding the organization of financial exchange markets. It derives conditions under which (1) a member-owned exchange has a monpoly over the trade of a particular financial contract and its close substitutes, and (2) exchange members earn economic rents.

Keywords: FINANCIAL; MARKET (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G10 G18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41 pages
Date: 1998
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:wablec:98-01

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