The Institutional Effect on Majority Rule Instability: Bicameralism in Spatial Policy Decisions

W.P. Bottom, C.L. Eavey, G.J. Miller and J. Nicoll

Washington University from Business, Law and Economics Center, John M. Olin School of Business, Washington University

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to report on experiments that test for an independent effect of bicameralism on legislative stability. The experiments are designed to test the theory of the bicameral core (Hammond and Miller 1986), which demonstrates that a bicameral legislature is more apt to have stable undominated policy choices than a unicameral legislature with the same number of legislators holding the same preferences.

Keywords: SOCIAL CHOICE; VOTING; INSTITUTIONS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 43 pages
Date: 1998
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:wablec:98-07

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Washington University from Business, Law and Economics Center, John M. Olin School of Business, Washington University Business, Law and Economics Center, John M. Olin School of Business, Washington University. Campus Box 1133, One Brookings Drive, St. Louis MO 63130-4899.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Krichel ().