Powerful Wives and Faithful Husbands

N. Maderner

Working Papers from Washington St. Louis - School of Business and Political Economy

Abstract: This paper studies the influence of social norms to a marriage bargaining process, when there is the private information on each player's side. We add hidden information on the player's characteristic or type to a marriage bargaining model where social norms determines the sharing rule for the gains from marriage. Then, unless one has a very high stand alone budget at his/her diposal, only unions between two high type persons can rach utility improvement for both.

Keywords: MARRIAGE; BARGAINING; INFORMATION; SOCIAL NORMS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C82 C83 D63 J12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 44 pages
Date: 1999
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:waslbp:9901

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