Effective Parties in a Model of Repeated Legislative Bargaining

R. Calvert and J. Fox

Working Papers from Western Sydney - School of Business And Technology

Abstract: A self-enforcing equilibrium account of legislative party organization in the context of the standard legislative bargaining model demonstrates how a member of a party would overcome the temptations to violate a party's agreement to stick together on legislative matters in the absence of external enforcement. The model is robust, and realistic, in the sense that departures from the equilibrium path lead eventually to restablishment of intra-party cooperation. Thus we construe legislative politics in a way that would support either a purely preference-based equilibrium or a equilibrium in which the legislature has an internal system of party organization that influences members sometimes to vote indifferently than they would based on their myopic issue preferences alone.

Keywords: POLITICAL PARTIES; LEGISLATIVE POWER; VOTING (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:wesybu:211

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