Why do women’s wages increase so slowly throughout their career? A dynamic model of statistical discrimination

Nathalie Havet () and Catherine Sofer ()

No 722, Working Papers from Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to explain the growing wage differentials between men and women during their working careers. We provide a dynamic model of statistical discrimination, which integrates specific human capital decisions: on-the-job training investment and wages are endogenously determined. We reveal a small wage differential at the beginning of women’s career, followed by a larger wage differential; this is partly due to a lower level of human capital investment by women and partly because firms smooth training costs between different periods.

Keywords: gender gaps; gender wage gap; specific human capital; statistical discrimination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J16 J24 J31 J62 J71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 2007-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-hrm and nep-lab
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ftp://ftp.gate.cnrs.fr/RePEc/2007/0722.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Why Do Women's Wages Increase So Slowly Throughout Their Career? A Dynamic Model of Statistical Discrimination (2008)
Working Paper: Why do women's wages increase so slowly throughout their career? A dynamic model of statistical discrimination (2008)
Working Paper: Why do women's wages increase so slowly throughout their career? A dynamic model of statistical discrimination (2008)
Working Paper: Why do women's wages increase so slowly throughout their career? A dynamic model of statistical discrimination (2008)
Working Paper: Why do women's wages increase so slowly throughout their career? A dynamic model of statistical discrimination (2007)
Working Paper: Why do women's wages increase so slowly throughout their career? A dynamic model of statistical discrimination (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gat:wpaper:0722

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