Mergers, cartels and leniency programs: the role of production capacities

Emilie Dargaud

No 814, Working Papers from Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon

Abstract: In this paper, we study the impact of a merger on collusion depending on the endowment of capital asset among firms. We show that the merger makes the collusion easier to sustain when asymmetric capital stock combines with less efficient insiders because of more symmetric conditions and closer incentive constraints. Moreover, this model allows us to determine an optimal threshold of asymmetry among insiders and outsiders such as a merger has pro-competitive effects and we compare this value with the value which would restore perfect symmetry between firms after the merger.

Keywords: leniency programs; merger; oligopoly supergame (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K42 L11 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2008
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com, nep-ind and nep-law
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
ftp://ftp.gate.cnrs.fr/RePEc/2008/0814.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Mergers, cartels and leniency programs: the role of production capacities (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gat:wpaper:0814

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Nelly Wirth ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).