Why royalties ? Evidence from French distribution networks

Muriel Fadairo ()
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Muriel Fadairo: Université de Lyon, Lyon, F-69007, France ; Université Jean Monnet ; CNRS, GATE Lyon St Etienne, Saint-Etienne, F-42000, France

No 1102, Working Papers from Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon

Abstract: This empirical note deals with the contractual design of relationships in distribution networks. In the framework of agency theory, I study the royalty rate as an incentive device for the upstream firm in maintaining brand-name value, using recent French data to estimate probit models. The results are consistent with the analytical framework.

Keywords: vertical relationships; distribution networks; contract design; two-sided moral hazard (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C12 L14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gat:wpaper:1102

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