Who’s Favored by Evaluative Voting ? An Experiment Conducted During the 2012 French Presidential Election

Antoinette Baujard, Frédéric Gavrel, Herrade Igersheim, Jean-François Laslier and Isabelle Lebon

No 1430, Working Papers from Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon

Abstract: Under evaluative voting, the voter freely grades each candidate on a numerical scale, with the winning candidate being determined by the sum of the grades they receive. This paper compares evaluative voting with the two-round system, reporting on an experiment, conducted during the 2012 French presidential election, which attracted 2,340 participants. Here we show that the two-round system favors “exclusive” candidates, that is candidates who elicit strong feelings, while evaluative rules favor “inclusive” candidates, that is candidates who attract the support of a large span of the electorate. These differences are explained by two complementary reasons : the opportunity for the voter to support several candidates under evaluative voting rules, and the specific pattern of strategic voting under the two-round voting rule.

Keywords: Voting; In Situ Experiment; Evaluative Voting; Approval Voting; Two-round system (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Who's Favored by Evaluative Voting? An Experiment Conducted During the 2012 French Presidential Election (2014)
Working Paper: Who’s Favored by Evaluative Voting ? An Experiment Conducted During the 2012 French Presidential Election (2013)
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