Network Form and Performance. The Case of Multi-Unit Franchising

Muriel Fadairo (), Cintya Lanchimba and Josef Windsperger ()
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Muriel Fadairo: Université de Lyon, Lyon, F-69007, France ; CNRS, GATE Lyon St Etienne,F-69130 Ecully, France, Université Jean Monnet, Saint-Etienne, F-42000, France
Josef Windsperger: University of Vienna, Austria, Faculty of Business, Economics and Statistics, Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1, 1090 Vienna

No 1502, Working Papers from Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon

Abstract: Multi-unit franchising (MUF) is a governance form inside franchising networks where the franchisor transfers to the franchisees the right to own and operate more than one outlet. While previous empirical literature has revealed various advantages of MUF as compared to single-unit franchising (SUF), we study the impact of this governance form on the network performance, taking into account different contexts. Our results from propensity score matching show that MUF leads to higher performance. However, non-parametric estimations highlight thresholds suggesting that a mix of SUF and MUF is a more efficient governance form than a pure MUF network.

Keywords: Network governance; franchising; propensity score matching; nonparametric regressions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C14 L14 M21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cse, nep-eff and nep-net
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Network Form and Performance. The Case of Multi-Unit Franchising (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gat:wpaper:1502

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