Information Order Shifts Criterion Placement in Perceptual Decisions

Thomas Garcia, Ismaël Rafaï () and Sébastien Massoni ()

No 1734, Working Papers from Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon

Abstract: Facing perceptual decisions with asymmetric stakes, individuals exhibit a conservative criterion placement. This bias prevents them from reaching the optimal decision process defined as the one which maximizes their expected payoffs. We propose in the present experimental study a non-invasive method to correct behaviors toward more optimality. We manipulate the information order between payoff information and perceptual evidence for three different incentive levels invariant regarding Signal Detection Theory predictions. Our results support the effectiveness of such manipulation: the decision strategy shifts toward optimality when payoff information is displayed last. The shift toward optimality is more pronounced for higher payoff contrasts. These results, which cannot be explained within the Signal Detection Theory framework, give new insights on the cognitive processes responsible for the conservative criterion placement

Keywords: conservative criterion placement; signal detection theory; optimality accuracy; information order (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 D91 Y8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
ftp://ftp.gate.cnrs.fr/RePEc/2017/1734.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Information Order Shifts Criterion Placement in Perceptual Decisions (2017)
Working Paper: Information Order Shifts Criterion Placement in Perceptual Decisions (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gat:wpaper:1734

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Nelly Wirth ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).