The Chamberlin-Courant Rule and the k-Scoring Rules: Agreement and Condorcet Committee Consistency

Mostapha Diss, Eric Kamwa and Abdelmonaim Tlidi ()
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Abdelmonaim Tlidi: University Cadi Ayyad of Marrakesh, GREER, National School of Applied Science-Safi, Route Sidi Bouzid, B.P. 63, 46000 Safi, Morocco

No 1812, Working Papers from Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon

Abstract: For committee or multiwinner elections, the Chamberlin-Courant rule (CCR), which combines the Borda rule and the proportional representation, aims to pick the most representative committee (Chamberlin and Courant, 1983). Chamberlin and Courant (1983) have shown that if the size of the committee to be elected is k = 1 among m ≥ 3 candidates, the CCR is equivalent to the Borda rule; Kamwa and Merlin (2014) claimed that if k = m − 1, the CCR is equivalent to the k-Plurality rule. In this paper, we explore what happens for 1

Keywords: Committee; Representativeness; Borda; Condorcet; Chamberlin-Courant; k-Scoring rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The Chamberlin-Courant Rule and the k-Scoring Rules: Agreement and Condorcet Committee Consistency (2018)
Working Paper: The Chamberlin-Courant Rule and the k-Scoring Rules: Agreement and Condorcet Committee Consistency (2018)
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