Double overreaction in beauty-contests with information acquisition: theory and experiment
Romain Baeriswyl (),
Kene Boun My () and
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Romain Baeriswyl: Swiss National Bank, Boersenstrasse 15, 8001 Zurich, Switzerland
No 1932, Working Papers from Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon
Central banks' disclosures, such as forward guidance, have a weaker effect on the economy in reality than in theoretical models. The present paper contributes to understanding how people pay attention and react to various sources of information. In a beauty-contest with information acquisition, we show that strategic complementarities give rise to a double overreaction to public disclosures by increasing agents equilibrium attention, which, in turn, increases the weight assigned to them in equilibrium action. A laboratory experiment provides evidence that the effect of strategic complementarities on the realised attention and the realised action is qualitatively consistent with theoretical predictions, though quantitatively weaker. Both the lack of attention to public disclosures and a limited level of reasoning by economic agents account for the weaker realised reaction. This suggests that it is just as important for a central bank to control reaction to public disclosures by swaying information acquisition by recipients as it is by shaping information disclosures themselves.
Keywords: beauty-contest; information acquisition; overreaction; central bank communication (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 E52 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-mac and nep-neu
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Journal Article: Double overreaction in beauty contests with information acquisition: Theory and experiment (2021)
Working Paper: Double overreaction in beauty-contests with information acquisition: theory and experiment (2021)
Working Paper: Double overreaction in beauty contests with information acquisition: theory and experiment (2020)
Working Paper: Double overreaction in beauty-contests with information acquisition: theory and experiment (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gat:wpaper:1932
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