Pairwise consensus and Borda rule
Muhammad Mahajne () and
Oscar Volij ()
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Muhammad Mahajne: Univ. Lyon, UJM Saint-Etienne, CNRS, GATE L-SE UMR 5824, F-42023 Saint-Etienne, France
No 2102, Working Papers from Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon
We say that a preference profile exhibits pairwise consensus around some fixed preference relation, if whenever a preference relation is closer to it than another one, the distance of the profile to the former is not greater than its distance to the latter. We say that a social choice rule satisfies the pairwise consensus property if it selects the top ranked alternative in the preference relation around which there is such a consensus. We show that the Borda rule is the unique scoring rule that satisfies this property.
Keywords: Consensus; Borda rule; scoring rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Pairwise consensus and Borda rule (2021)
Working Paper: PAIRWISE CONSENSUS AND THE BORDA RULE (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gat:wpaper:2102
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