Impure motivations in social preferences: Experimental evidence from menu choices

Yosuke Hashidate, Tetsuya Kawamura, Fabrice Le Lec, Yusuke Osaki and Benoît Tarroux
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Yosuke Hashidate: Sophia University
Tetsuya Kawamura: Tezukayama University
Yusuke Osaki: Waseda University
Benoît Tarroux: Université Lumière Lyon 2, CNRS, Université Jean-Monnet Saint-Etienne, emlyon business school, GATE, 69007, Lyon, France

No 2406, Working Papers from Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon

Abstract: This article investigates impure motivations in social preferences through an experiment in which participants choose menus of social allocations (i.e. allocations of gains between themselves and another participant). Menu choices reveal the presence of impure motivations: according to a parsimonious theoretical model, negative motivations (e.g. guilt) will imply a preference for smaller menus, whereas positive ones (e.g. pride) a preference for larger sets. By varying the level of publicity of within-menu choice, we can also observe the importance of self- and social image. Data from France and Japan show unambiguously an important impact of impure motivations on preferences on menus, with the suggestion that negative ones exceed positive ones.

Keywords: Social preference; menu preference; impure motivation; warm glow; guilt; shame; pride; self-esteem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D01 D64 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm and nep-exp
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