On the redistributive impact of privitazing a resource under imperfect enforcement

Stefan Ambec and Louis Hotte ()

Working Papers from Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL)

Abstract: We consider the redistributive effects of privatizing a resource previously exploited under free access. We assume that illegal extraction is punished but that the sanction is bounded by individual's wealth. First, we show that a segment of intermediate-wea lth individuals is the most adversely affected from the regime change, while the poorest segment is not only less severely affected, but may actually gain from it. Next, we show how the authorities may prefer to choose an intermediate enforcement level in order to maximize the political acceptability of the regime switch among the local community.

Keywords: PROPERTY RIGHTS; ENFORCEMENT; WEALTH DISTRIBUTION; NATURAL RESOURCES; ILLEGAL EXTRACTION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D78 K42 O13 O17 Q21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Related works:
Journal Article: On the redistributive impact of privatizing a resource under imperfect enforcement (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gbl:wpaper:200302

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