La disciplina degli aiuti fiscali tra la funzione di controllo e quella di armonizzazione impropria: il ruolo della selettivitÃ

Marco Boccaccio

No 20, Public Finance Research Papers from Istituto di Economia e Finanza, DSGE, Sapienza University of Rome

Abstract: Fiscal measures between proper state aid control and improper harmonization: the role of selectivity The notion of selectivity has gained the center stage in European state aid control. A wide interpretation of this notion can lead to an excessive limitation of Member States autonomy. This is particularly dangerous in the case of fiscal aids since Member States still retain exclusive power over direct taxation, and state aid can be misused so to partially overcome the political obstacles to tax harmonization. In this article it will be presented how the interpretation of selectivity evolved from the 1998 Commission Notice on state aid and direct taxation to the recent cases of tax rulings. This evolution has seen a parallel increase in the conflict between state aid control at european level and member State complaints in defence of their autonomy

Keywords: European state aid control; direct taxation; selectivity. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H25 K29 Z18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2016-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gfe:pfrp00:00020

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