Resistance to the Regulation of Common Resources in Rural Tunisia
Xiaoying Liu (),
Mare Sarr () and
Timothy Swanson ()
No 30-2014, CIES Research Paper series from Centre for International Environmental Studies, The Graduate Institute
We examine the effect of the introduction of uniform water-charging for aquifer management and provide evidence using a survey-based choice experiment of agricultural water users in rural Tunisia. Theoretically, we show that the implementation of the proposed second-best regulation would result both in efficiency gains and in distributional effects in favour of small landholders. Empirically, we find that resistance to the introduction of an effective water-charging regime is greatest amongst the largest landholders. Resistance to the regulation of common resources may be rooted in the manner in which heterogeneity might determine the distributional impact of different management regimes.
Pages: 55 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr, nep-ara, nep-dev and nep-env
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Working Paper: Resistance to the Regulation of Common Resources in Rural Tunisia (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gii:ciesrp:cies_rp_30
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