Standards of proofs in sequential merger control procedures
Vilen Lipatovz and
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Gregor Langus: CET, European Commission
Vilen Lipatovz: Compass Lexecon Brussels
No 05-2018, IHEID Working Papers from Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies
We model merger control procedures as a process of sequential acquisition of information in which mergers can be cleared after a ?first phase of investigation. We fi?nd that the enforceability of clearance decisions at the end of the fi?rst phase is unattractive to the extent that it prevents the authorities to use their expectations as to whether evidence gathered in the fi?rst phase will be confi?rmed in the second phase. This deprives the ?first phase of its potential as an effective screening mechanism. We also fi?nd that when clearance decisions in the fi?rst phase are enforceable, a different (higher) standard in the fi?rst phase is only desirable when Phase I decisions are captured by merging parties (as opposed to complainants).
Keywords: merger procedure; competition policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 K40 L40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-law and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gii:giihei:heidwp05-2018
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