Who Is Claiming For Fixed-Term Contracts?
Dany Jaimovich and
No 07-2009, IHEID Working Papers from Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies
The present study aims to contribute to the debate concerning the effects on economic performance and the structure of the labor market of regulations that combine high Employment Protection Legislations (EPL) with consent for the use of fixed-term contracts (FTC). Using a Rajan and Zingales (1998) difference-in-difference empirical technique in a panel of 45 countries, we explore the response of industries that differ in their "intrinsic need" of worker turnover when they face different levels of EPL and how the possibility of using FTC might change the outcome. Our approach suggests an original demand side explanation of the claiming of FTC.
Keywords: Employment protection legislation; labor turnover; fixed term contracts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J21 J33 J63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-09, Revised 2009-09
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gii:giihei:heidwp07-2009
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