Atomic Cournotian traders may be Walrasian

Giulio Codognato, Sayantan Ghosal and Simone Tonin

Working Papers from Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow

Abstract: In a bilateral oligopoly, with large traders, represented as atoms, and small traders, represented by an atomless part, when is there a non-empty intersection between the sets of Walras and Cournot-Nash allocations? Using a two commodity version of the Shapley window model, we show that a necessary and sufficient condition for a Cournot- Nash allocation to be a Walras allocation is that all atoms demand a null amount of one of the two commodities. We provide two exam- ples which show that this characterization holds non-vacuously. When our condition fails to hold, we also confirm, through some examples, the result obtained by Okuno, Postlewaite, and Roberts (1980): small traders always have a negligible influence on prices, while the large traders keep their strategic power even when their behavior turns out to be Walrasian in the cooperative framework considered by Gabszewicz and Mertens (1971) and Shitovitz (1973).

JEL-codes: C71 C72 D51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-gth
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Journal Article: Atomic Cournotian traders may be Walrasian (2015)
Working Paper: Atomic Cournotian Traders May Be Walrasian (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gla:glaewp:2014_12

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