Marriage market equilibrium with matching on latent ability: Identification using a compulsory schooling expansion

Dan Anderberg, Jesper Bagger, V. Bhaskar and Tanya Wilson

Working Papers from Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow

Abstract: We use the 1972 UK Raising of the School-Leaving Age (RoSLA) to identify and estimate an equilibrium marriage market model with sorting on academic qualifications and latent ability. Our identification hinges on a RoSLA-induced discontinuity in the distribution of qualifications. We disentangle the contributions of qualification and ability to marital surplus; we find that they are complements. Ability increases the probability of ever marrying; a basic qualification does not. The observed marriage gap between basic qualified and unqualified individuals is entirely due to selection on ability. The RoSLA worsened marital prospects of low ability individuals, through general equilibrium effects.

Keywords: Marriage; Assortative mating; Return to education; Latent ability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D10 D13 I26 J12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dem, nep-edu and nep-eur
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gla:glaewp:2022_11

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